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Game Analysis of Government's Response to Network Public Opinion 
 




School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum-Beijing, 
Beijing, 102249, China 
 
Abstract: The network public opinion has brought certain challenges to the authority of the government and the control of 
social order. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes the network public opinion game model of 
government, netizens, Internet celebrity, network media, and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyze the game 
process of participants. Finally, according to the evolutionary stabilization strategy, put forward relevant countermeasures to 
the government in dealing with network public opinion of emergencies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The network public opinion, that is, the public's attention to an event has produced a certain impact and 
personal tendencies of views and statements. The uncontrolled network public opinion easily leads to 
emergencies, at the same time, emergencies affect network public sentiment
[1]
. As the scale of netizens is 
growing, the power of their speech can’t be ignored. Once some negative phenomena or topic-sensitive 
incidents occur, they will spread rapidly on the Internet and have a negative impact. 
For the government, how to improve handling capacity of network public opinion is crucial to avoid the 
deterioration of public opinion and secondary events. But the development of network public opinion is formed 
by multi-participants. Different participants choose different strategies and adjust them according to their own 
interests. This paper studies the game process between the government, netizens, network Internet celebrity, 
network media from the perspective of four participants of network public opinion, and uses the replication 
dynamic equation in the evolutionary game to analyze the game strategy choice of the main players of network 
public opinion, so as to provide effective strategic suggestions for the government to the network public 
opinion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Generally speaking, many scholars at home and abroad have study the dissemination and development of 
public opinion and proposed a number of social network models. Public opinion plays a key role in many fields, 








 , etc. Wu
[6]
 presented a public 
opinion model based on Shannon entropy and used the Holme-Kim network to stimulate, this model help 
understand the dynamics of opinion entropy, and control the public opinion. Li
[7]
 proposed an improved KH 
model based on BA model, it considered the intimacy and personality of agents as well as environmental factor 
to support for the guidance of the public opinion. 
In recent years, public opinion can be put forward in a more plentiful definition with the rapid development 
of the Internet, as we called network public opinion. But,research on public network opinion is still in the 
preliminary stage. Suo[8] proposed a simple model to analyze the dynamics of four kinds of networks, its 
simulations result represent that regular communities establish not only local consensus, but also global 
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diversity in public opinions. Zhu
[9] 
proposed the SIRS model of network public opinion dissemination, which 
comprehensively measured the characteristics of network public opinion dissemination on micro-blog platform. 
Fang
[10]
 used cellular automata to construct a network public opinion dissemination model in theory, and used 
computer simulation technology to verify the feasibility of the model. Liu
[11]
 established Stackelberg multi-stage 
game model, pointed out that the possibility of government opportunism is based on the evolution of netizens' 
group strategy. Wei
[12]
 established an improved Brookes knowledge equation to identify the conditions for the 
dissemination of network public opinion. Zhang
[13]
 constructed an evolutionary game model of rumor spreading 
among individuals, and carried out agent-based simulation experiments. 
 




refers to the administrative agency that guides in the development process of the network 
public opinion. As a manager , the government can deal with network public opinion in a controlled or 
unregulated manner, and different coping strategies will lead to different public opinion development. If the 
government adopts an unregulated attitude, conceal the truth or deceive the public, it will lead to serious 
consequences such as reduced trust, public sentiment, and public opinion crisis. 
 
3.2 Netizen 
Netizens are the main carriers in the process of network public opinion communication. They can freely 
publish personalized opinions on the network platform and spread them through the network. They can express 
their opinions anytime and anywhere, and can also communicate and exchange opinions with others. However, 
freedom of speech has also led to many netizens posting many false speeches and messages, which has caused 
the network public opinion to have a bad influence in the process of dissemination.  
3.3 Internet celebrity 
Internet celebrity
 
is usually a network public figure, they are certified on the web platform, have a large 
number of fans, and have a wide range of personal influence. The comments they posted on the Internet often 
have the role of guiding netizens. As the "opinion leaders" on the Internet, they are the main representative 
power of the network voice. They can influence the network public opinion environment, whether it is to 
publish positive or negative speech opinions, it will have a certain impact of public opinion. 
3.4 Network media 
With the development of Internet technology, network media has a greater impact on our lives than 
traditional media. Most network media rely on network platforms to disseminate information. According to the 
purpose of the services, we can divide them into four categories: government news websites, business news 
websites, news media websites and representative local websites. However, the online media referred to in this 
paper refers to commercial network platforms such as Sina, NetEase and Tencent. 
 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF QUADRIPARTITE GAME MODEL OF NETWORK PUBLIC OPINION 
Based on the existing research
[14][15]
, this paper improves the game model of network public opinion. In 
addition to the government, netizens and network media, this paper also considers the role of Internet celebrity 
in the process of network public opinion game, and considers different income and cost parameters in the 
process of game. Previous studies
 
are mostly based on traditional game theory, assuming that participants are 
completely rational. However, according to the actual situation, the participants of network public opinion are 
not completely rational, and have the characteristics of "group character", "slow learning speed" and "repeated 
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game", so this paper uses the replication dynamics of evolutionary game to analyze. 
4.1 Model hypothesis 
 Participants: government, netizens, Internet celebrity, network media 
 Strategies set of participants: government {control, not control}; netizens {participate, not 
participate}; Internet celebrity {positive, negative}; network media {report, not report}. 
 The parameters in the game are set as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Main parameters and their implications 
Participants Parameter Parameter implication Participants Parameter Parameter implication 
Government 




  Positive Publication of 
Speech Probability 
   Benefits from social order 
stability 
   Benefits from social order 
stability 
   Fines (Internet celebrity or 
Network Media) 
   Netizens’ Response 
Benefits 
   Government Control Cost    marketing cost 
   The cost of social disorder    Government fines 
Participants Parameter Parameter implication Participants Parameter Parameter implication 
Netizens 
  Participation probability 
Network 
media 
  Reporting probability 
   Benefits from social order 
stability 
   Traffic click revenue 
   Information Leading Benefits    Advertising revenue 
   Access to additional information 
costs 
   Reporting cost 
   Loss of information lag    Government fines 
4.2 Combination of game strategies and revenue 
According to the above hypothesis, each participant has two opposing strategic combinations, totaling 16 
kinds. Then the revenue matrix of the government-netizen-Internet celebrity-network media quadripartite game 
constructed in this paper is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Government-Netizens-Internet celebrity-Network Media Revenue Matrix 
Game strategy Income 
(control,participate,positive,report) (        ,     ，  +  -  ,           ) 
(control,participate,positive,not report) (     ,        ,  +  -  ,0) 
(control,participate,negative,report) (                                       ) 
(control,participate,negative,not report) (        ,        ,            ,0) 
(control,not participate,positive,report) (        ,     ,   -  ,           ) 
(control,not participate,positive,not report) (     ,     ,   -  ,0) 
(control,not participate,negative,report) (               ,         ,           ) 
(control,not participate,negative,not report) (        ,     ,         ,0) 
(not control,participate,positive,report) (     ,  ,      ,           ) 
(not control,participate,positive,not report) (   ,     ,      ,0) 
The Eighteenth Wuhan International Conference on E- Digital Transformation                               83 
 
Game strategy Income 
(not control,participate,negative,report) (      ,  ,         ,           ) 
(not control,participate,negative,not report) (     ,     ,         ,0) 
(not control,not participate,positive,report) (     ,-  ,   ,           ) 
(not control,not participate,positive,not report) (   , -  ,   ,0) 
(not control,not participate,negative,report) (      , -  ,      ,           ) 
(not control,not participate,negative,not report) (     , -  ,      ,0) 
4.3 Model solution 
4.3.1 Duplication dynamic equation of government  
The benefits of governments' regulatory response strategies are            ,the benefits of setting up 
governments to adopt regardless response strategies are                .The expected revenue of the 
government is   ,the calculation formulas are as follows:  
                                                     -   (1) 
                                          (2) 
Therefore, the government adopts control strategy to cope with the replication dynamic equation of 
network public opinion as follows:      
  
  
                                    
 If           ，so      
  
  
  ，so when   takes any value, it is stable.  
 If           , make      
  
  
  , when   0 or    , it is stable.  
     
  
     
 , 
     
  
      , so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the government should adopt the control 
strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy. 
 If           , make      
  
  
  , when   0 or    , it is stable.  
     
  
     
 , 
     
  
      , so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the government should adopt the not control 
strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy. 
4.3.2 Duplication dynamic equation of netizen  
The benefits of netizens' participation strategy are as follows：               ，the benefits of netizens' 
non-participation strategy are as follows:                    .The expected income of netizens is   ，the 
calculation formulas are as follows: 
                     +  +(    )                               (3) 
         +  +(    )         (      ) (4) 
Therefore, the replication dynamic equation of netizens' participation in network public opinion is as 
follows：      
  
  
                                +(    )        
 If     
     
  
，so      
  
  
  ，so when   takes any value, it is stable. 
 If     
     
  
, make      
  
  
  , when     or 
                 
     
  
      , 
     
  
      ，so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, netizens should 
adopt participatory strategies to cope with the network public opinion, which is an evolutionary and stable 
strategy. 
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 If     
     
  
, make      
  
  
  , when     or 
                 
     
  
      , 
     
  
      ，so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, netizens should 
adopt non-participatory strategies to cope with the network public opinion, which is an evolutionary and stable 
strategy. 
4.3.3 Duplication dynamic equation of internet celebrity  
Setting up Internet celebrity to adopt positive strategies benefits as follows:            ，the Internet 
celebrity takes the negative strategy the benefit is as follows             ，expected revenue of  Internet 
celebrity is   ，the calculation formulas are as follows: 
            =    +    -               =    +    -  -   (5) 
         +    -   +(1-  )(    +    -  -  )  (6) 
Therefore, the dynamic equation of the Internet celebrity actively responding to the network public opinion 
is:     
  
  
                             
 If     , so      
  
  
  , so when   takes any value, it is stable. 
 If     ,make      
  
  
  ,when     or                  
     
  
      , 
     
  
      ，so 
    is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network V should adopt a positive strategy to deal with the 
network public opinion is an evolutionary stability strategy. 
 If     ,make      
  
  
  ,when     or                  
     
  
      , 
     
  
      ，so 
    is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network V should adopt a negative strategy to deal with the 
network public opinion is an evolutionary stability strategy. 
4.3.4 Duplication dynamic equation of network media  
The benefits of adopting the reporting strategy in the network media are as follows:          ，The 
benefits of online media's non-reporting strategy are as follows:              .The expected revenue of 
network media is as follows:  ，the calculation formulas are as follows: 
                                       0 (7) 
                     (8) 
So the replication dynamic equation of network media reporting network public opinion is as follows: 
     
  
  
                                      
 If              ,so      
  
  
  ,so when   takes any value, it is stable. 
 If              ,make      
  
  
  ,when     or                 .  
     
  
     
 , 
     
  
      ，so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network media should adopt the reporting 
strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy. 
 If              ,make      
  
  
  ,when     or                 .  
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 , 
     
  
      ，so     is the equilibrium point. Therefore, the network media should not adopt the 
reporting strategy to deal with the network public opinion is an evolutionary and stable strategy. 
 
5. STRAREGIC SUGGESTIONS ON GOVERNMENTS 
In the process of the development of network public opinion, the strategic choice of the four participants 
has an important impact on it. The government should take into account the three main participants, in order to 
maximize its own benefits, and then make strategic choices. According to the results of the game model above, 
this paper proposes the following suggestions: 
 We should standardize netizens' online access mechanism and adopt a real-name system. From the 
above game analysis results, it can be seen that the participation or non-participation strategies of netizens 
mainly depend on the profit of leading information   , loss of lagging information   .If the government 
adopts the real-name network system, netizens will weigh the relationship between their    and their cost 
when they express their opinions on the network public opinion.  
 Effective management of Internet celebrity. From the analysis of the above game results, it can be 
seen that the positive or negative attitude of the Internet celebrity to deal with the network public opinion mainly 
depends on the government's fine   . If the government takes certain punishment measures for its bad speech, 
then Internet celebrity will actively respond to the network public opinion and express its own objective views 
to guide ordinary netizens.  
 Improve the network media channels to ensure the correct and effective transmission of public 
opinion information. From the game analysis results, we can also see that the network media is weighing the 
positive and negative value of its revenue to decide whether to report or not. The government can regulate the 
behavior of the network media by increasing the click-through revenue    and advertising revenue    and 
reducing the fines    when the government controls the network public opinion. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper uses evolutionary game theory which is different from traditional game theory to analyze the 
quadripartite network public opinion model of government, netizens, Internet celebrity and network media. At 
the same time, we use replication dynamic equation to analyze evolutionary stability strategy to make 
suggestions for the government in dealing with network public opinion. The disadvantage of this paper is that it 
puts forward relatively simple parameters and simplifies the actual network public opinion model. In the future 
research, we should consider more relevant factors in this model. 
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